

## Motivation

- ◆ Social recommendation of products and services is very useful for enlarging the market share.
- ◆ Individuals are incentivized to recommend services to their friends and acquaintances.
- ◆ Uber, Lyft give free rides for recommending the app, Living Social gives discounts if recommendations lead to purchase.
- ✗ Referrals come at a big price. Giving referral incentives to everyone may not be a good idea.
- ◆ Provide referral incentives to only a few individuals that are capable of spreading the campaign.

## The Problem and Proposed Solution

- ◆ **Marketing campaign for a freemium service.**
- ◆ **Goal : Maximize registrations.**
  - Maximize registrations (campaign size) for a given cost budget.
  - Achieve a given marketing target with minimum cost.
- ◆ **Solution : Probabilistic Incentivization**
  - Incentivize individuals with degree  $k$  with probability  $\phi(k)$
  - Incentives provided to individuals for recommending service to friends.
  - Provide incentives only if they register.

## Campaign Spreading Model




Figure 1: Flow chart denoting the various stages of a node;  $v_i$  denotes a deterministic threshold of node  $i$ , and  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$  are the probability of activation of the incentivized and non-incentivized nodes, respectively.

## Network Assumptions

- ◆ **Uncorrelated network**
  - Probability that an edge exists between two randomly chosen nodes is independent of the properties (such as degree) of the nodes.
- ◆ **Locally tree like network**

## Optimization Problem Formulation and Main Results

### Problem Formulation

$$\min_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \sum_{k \geq 1} c_k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k) \cdot s_k(q)$$

Subject to:

$$s(q) \geq \gamma$$

$$q = \frac{1}{\bar{d}} \sum_{k \geq 1} k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k)$$

$$\max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} s(q)$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{k \geq 1} c_k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k) \cdot s_k(q) \leq \bar{c}$$

$$q = \frac{1}{\bar{d}} \sum_{k \geq 1} k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k)$$

### Size of the campaign

- $s(q)$  is the probability that a randomly chosen node registers for a campaign.
- $s_k(q)$  is the probability that a node with  $k$  neighbors registers for the campaign
- $p(k)$  is the degree distribution.
- $\bar{d}$  is the mean degree.
- $s(q) = g(q, u)|_{u=u_q}$  and  $s_k(q) = g_k(q, u)|_{u=u_q}$  where  $u_q$  is the solution of the fixed point equation  $u = g(q, u)$

$$g(q, u) = \sum_{k \geq 1} p(k) \sum_{m \geq 1} p_{th}(m|k) \sum_{k_2=0}^k \hat{p}(k_2|k) \cdot P[X_{k_2} + Y_{k-k_2} \geq m] + \sum_{k \geq 1} p(k) \cdot p_{th}(0|k)$$

$$g_k(q, u) = \sum_{m \geq 1} p_{th}(m|k) \sum_{k_2=0}^k \hat{p}(k_2|k) \cdot P[X_{k_2} + Y_{k-k_2} \geq m] + p_{th}(0|k)$$

where  $X_{k_2} \sim \text{Bin}(k_2, \alpha_2 u)$  and  $Y_{k-k_2} \sim \text{Bin}(k-k_2, \alpha_1 u)$

### Proposition

$$\text{If } \alpha_2 > \alpha_1, \text{ then } \frac{\partial s(q)}{\partial q} > 0$$

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$$\text{If } \alpha_2 > \alpha_1, \text{ then for all } k \geq 1, \frac{\partial s_k(q)}{\partial q} \geq 0$$

### Simplified Optimization Problems

$$\min_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} \sum_{k \geq 1} c_k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k) \cdot s_k(q)$$

Subject to:

$$q \geq q_\gamma$$

$$q = \frac{1}{\bar{d}} \sum_{k \geq 1} k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k)$$

$$\max_{0 \leq \phi \leq 1} q$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{k \geq 1} c_k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k) \cdot s_k(q) \leq \bar{c}$$

$$q = \frac{1}{\bar{d}} \sum_{k \geq 1} k \cdot p(k) \cdot \phi(k)$$

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

## Results

### Real World Networks

Table 1: Simple Parameters of the two real-world networks used for simulations.

	Network A	Network B
Source	p2p-Gnutella08	Hamsterster
Network category	Peer-to-peer	Social
Nodes	6301	2426
Edges	20777	16631
Maximum degree	273	97
Average degree	6.59	13.71
Number of triangles	2383	53265
Clustering coefficient	0.01	0.51
Connected components	2	148

### Numerical Validation




Figure 2: Analytical and simulated values of average cost vs.  $\gamma$  for Gnutella network.




Figure 3: Analytical and simulated values of average cost vs.  $\gamma$  for Hamsterster network.

## Conclusion

- ✓ Studied the problem of campaigning in social networks (for marketing a free or freemium service) by offering incentives for referrals.
- ✓ Used results from reliability theory that enabled us to solve the optimization problems with simple algorithms
- ✓ Showed that our analytical results are applicable in real world social networks