

Non-Interactive Hierarchical Id-based Key Agreement in MANETs



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Problem Statement

Design a secure and efficient *Non-Interactive, Hierarchical, Identity-based* Key Agreement scheme for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks which is fully *Resilient* at each level against arbitrary number of node compromises

Jargons

- **MANET** : is an infrastructure-less and wireless network composed of mobile nodes
- **Key Agreement Protocol** : allows two or more parties to agree on a shared secret key

Ad-hoc Networks

- MANETs find application in
 - establishing Tactical Networks for Military
 - communication in disaster hit areas
- MANET nodes are constrained in :
 - Computational capabilities
 - Communicational capabilities
- The nodes are usually mobile and have limited battery supply

HH-KAS

- Hybrid Hierarchical scheme (HH-KAS) was introduced for key agreement in MANETs by Gennaro et al. in 2008
- HH-KAS scheme comprises:
 - a linear hierarchical key agreement scheme at non-leaf levels, and
 - SOK key agreement scheme given by Sakai et al. at leaf level.
- HH-KAS is fully resilient at leaf level and resilient upto a threshold at non-leaf levels


Tools

- Let G_1, G_2, G_T be cyclic prime order groups then, *pairing* is a efficiently computable map $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$ which satisfies :
 - Bilinearity : $\forall a, b \in F_q^*, \forall P \in G_1, \forall Q \in G_2 : e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$
 - Non-degeneracy : $e(P, Q) \neq 1$
- Basic Id One way function Scheme (BIOS) is a deterministic key pre-distribution (KPD) scheme introduced by Lee and Stinson
- BIOS achieves perfect resiliency and complete connectivity with fewer keys/node when compared to randomized KPD schemes.

References

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- Lee J., and Stinson D.R., Deterministic Key Predistribution Schemes for Distributed Sensor Networks, SAC, 2004
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
BIOS-SOK Key Agreement Scheme



Id	Secret Keys
A	$K_A, h(K_E Id_A), h(K_D Id_A)$
B	$K_B, h(K_A Id_B), h(K_E Id_B)$
C	$K_C, h(K_B Id_C), h(K_A Id_C)$
D	$K_D, h(K_C Id_D), h(K_B Id_D)$
E	$K_E, h(K_D Id_E), h(K_C Id_E)$

- h is a one-way hash function
- Shared secret key of A and B is $s_{AB} = h(K_A || Id_B)$ which is possessed by B and can be computed by A

$$\# \text{ of keys/ node} = \lceil \frac{n-1}{2} \rceil + 1$$



Id	Secret Keys
A	$s \cdot H \cdot (Id_A)$
B	$s \cdot H \cdot (Id_B)$
C	$s \cdot H \cdot (Id_C)$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Shared Key between A and B :} \\ K_{AB} &= e(s \cdot H(Id_A), H(Id_B)) \\ &= e(H(Id_A), s \cdot H(Id_B)) \\ &= K_{BA} \end{aligned}$$

PKG runs following three algorithms :


- 1) **Setup** : takes security parameter as input and outputs public parameters (params) and master secret key (msk)
- 2) **Extract** : using msk and identities of nodes, PKG generates their secret keys
- 3) **Shared Key** : using params, its own secret key and peer's identity, a node computes its shared key with the peer

Basic Id One-way Function Scheme

At Level 1

SOK Key Agreement Scheme

Beyond Level 1



Id	Secret Keys
A ₁	$s_{AA} \cdot H(A_1), s_{AB} \cdot H(A_1), s_{AC} \cdot H(A_1), s_{AD} \cdot H(A_1), s_{AE} \cdot H(A_1)$
A ₂	$s_{AA} \cdot H(A_2), s_{AB} \cdot H(A_2), s_{AC} \cdot H(A_2), s_{AD} \cdot H(A_2), s_{AE} \cdot H(A_2)$
B ₁	$s_{BA} \cdot H(B_1), s_{BB} \cdot H(B_1), s_{BC} \cdot H(B_1), s_{BD} \cdot H(B_1), s_{BE} \cdot H(B_1)$
C ₁	$s_{CA} \cdot H(C_1), s_{CB} \cdot H(C_1), s_{CC} \cdot H(C_1), s_{CD} \cdot H(C_1), s_{CE} \cdot H(C_1)$
D ₁	$s_{DA} \cdot H(D_1), s_{DB} \cdot H(D_1), s_{DC} \cdot H(D_1), s_{DD} \cdot H(D_1), s_{DE} \cdot H(D_1)$
E ₁	$s_{EA} \cdot H(E_1), s_{EB} \cdot H(E_1), s_{EC} \cdot H(E_1), s_{ED} \cdot H(E_1), s_{EE} \cdot H(E_1)$

Secret Keys at Level 1

Id	Secret Keys
A	$K_A, h(K_E Id_A), h(K_D Id_A)$
B	$K_B, h(K_A Id_B), h(K_E Id_B)$
C	$K_C, h(K_B Id_C), h(K_A Id_C)$
D	$K_D, h(K_C Id_D), h(K_B Id_D)$
E	$K_E, h(K_D Id_E), h(K_C Id_E)$

Shared Keys at Level 1 for Node A

$s_{AB} = h(K_A Id_B) = s_{BA}$
$s_{AC} = h(K_A Id_C) = s_{CA}$
$s_{AD} = h(K_A Id_D) = s_{DA}$
$s_{AE} = h(K_A Id_E) = s_{EA}$
$s_{AA} = h(K_A Id_A)$

Shared Keys at Level 2 for Node A₁

$s_{A_1A_2} = e(s_{AA} \cdot H(A_1), H(A_2)) = e(H(A_1), s_{AA} \cdot H(A_2)) = s_{A_2A_1}$
$s_{A_1B_1} = e(s_{AB} \cdot H(A_1), H(B_1)) = e(H(A_1), s_{BA} \cdot H(B_1)) = s_{B_1A_1}$
$s_{A_1C_1} = e(s_{AC} \cdot H(A_1), H(C_1)) = e(H(A_1), s_{CA} \cdot H(C_1)) = s_{C_1A_1}$
$s_{A_1D_1} = e(s_{AD} \cdot H(A_1), H(D_1)) = e(H(A_1), s_{DA} \cdot H(D_1)) = s_{D_1A_1}$
$s_{A_1E_1} = e(s_{AE} \cdot H(A_1), H(E_1)) = e(H(A_1), s_{EA} \cdot H(E_1)) = s_{E_1A_1}$

BIOS - SOK Key Agreement Scheme

Comparison of BIOS-SOK and HH-KAS

Scheme :	Polynomial based HH-KAS		Subset based HH-KAS		BIOS-SOK KAS	
	$t_1 = t_2 = 3$	$t_1 = 7, t_2 = 31$	$t_1 = t_2 = 3$	$t_1 = 7, t_2 = 31$	$n_1 = n_2 = 4$	$n_1 = 8, n_2 = 32$
Thresholds :						
Key-Size (# of group elements)	Root : 100 Leaves : 16	Root : 19008 Leaves : 256	Root : 28768 Leaves : 1800	Root : 8930800 Leaves : 35000	Root : 4 Level 1 : 3 Level 2 : 4 Leaves : 4	Root: 8 Level 1 : 6 Level 2: 8 Leaves: 32
Shared Key Computation	1 pairing 16 EC mult's	1 pairing 256 EC mult's	1 pairing 450 EC add's 1800 hashing	1 pairing 11000 EC add's 35000 hashing	3 pairings 6 hashing	3 pairings 6 hashing
Shared Key Computation (in terms of field mult's)	39703 m	407623 m	587125 m	11052275 m	47415 m	47415 m

Properties

- **Non-Interactive** : Any two nodes can compute a shared secret key without any interaction
- **Identity-based** : to compute the shared secret key, a node only needs its own secret key and peer's identity
- **Hierarchical** : intermediate nodes in the hierarchy can derive the secret keys for their children
- **Resilient** : the scheme is fully resilient against compromise of arbitrary number of nodes at each level
- **Efficient** : Compared to HH-KAS, BIOS-SOK is better in terms of computation time, space requirement and scalability